Introduction
In context with the aim of the article which is to analyse the impact of behavioural economics on regulatory law and government policies, the article is divided into several interconnected sections fi rst of which is behavioural economics as an actual fi eld of study. As a follow up of the fi ndings it then seems necessary to provide further attention to the aspect of rationality, which is one of the core aspects of neoclassical main stream economics and as BE is based on the criticism of this assumption it seems necessary to give space to rationality, diff erence between rationality and being rational, and introduces the core aspect of Behavioural economics 2 which is the bounded rationality concept. Once the above mentioned aspects have been introduced the article then analyses the impact on law and policies today and leads to the analysis of concepts of Behavioural law and economics 3 . It also discusses its negative eff ects which are mainly focused on the idea of so called soft paternalism which seems to be the answer given by BLE. Consequently this provides a lot of room for regulatory law and government policy in order to guide agents to their most satisfactory choice but on the other hand interfere with the concept of the individuals´ or the agents´ free will as well as the ability to pursue what they believe is best for them. Hence quite controversial reception of such fi ndings may oft en be expected.
Behavioural economics

4
As the name indicates, behavioural economics is a so called hybrid area of research that incorporates principles, concepts and ideas mainly from psychology but also from other social sciences like sociology, philosophy or politics into economic theory. 5 Simply put when referring to behavioural economics it is understood to have in mind the amalgamation of economics with psychology, but it could include the combination of economics with any other social science.
But is there a necessity to combine these diff erent fi elds? And if so, for what purposes? It all comes from the idea of a so called rational agent. What is the rational agent? From the very birth of economics as a discipline and the conceptualisation of Adam Smith one of the key elements is the presumption that a man is rational and would try to maximise his resources.
Yet many challenges posed to mainstream economics have inspired contemporary behavioural economists to develop alternative models of choice that better explain why and in what contexts individuals might select courses of action or consumption alternatives, which are regarded as biased or even irrational. 6 One of the major problems of the so called main stream economics is the fact that it is based on the presumption of the rational agent. But unfortunately in real life there are many examples which seem to indicate that agents are irrational, that very oft en agents or in other words humans make decisions which appear at face value to contradict the principle that agents act in a rational way.
Behavioural economics tries to explain and ultimately to apply these fi ndings into practice, that is why individuals frequently make irrational decisions and choices, and why and how their behaviour does not match the patterns predicted by neoclassical models. Behavioural economists replace the assumption of rationality with one of so called bounded rationality, in which consumers ´ actions are aff ected by their initial endowments, their tastes for fairness, their inability to appreciate future costs, their lack of self-control, and the general use of fl awed heuristics. 8 Behavioural economists try to make sense of the agent's actions and take into account all these variables in order to predict various outcomes and impacts on the economy.
So where does Behavioural economics have its roots? In some respects it's not as new as some might think and the birth of this academic discipline can be traced back to the mid twentieth century. It is the Michigan Institute of Social Research that has been credited as the place this discipline fi rst took off .
Th en the use of behavioural economics was initially popularized at the University of Michigan's Institute of Social Research in the late 1940s, where George Katona understood behavioural economics as investigating economic behaviour.
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Th ough others have stated that the studies of Allias and Elsberg were the fi rst in the fi eld of behavioural economics. Th at takes us back to the years 1953 when Allais and 1961 when Elsberg came out with publications concerning the paradox of the rational choices on the notion of unclear decision theory. Yet it is only relatively recently that behavioural economics has really established itself as an alternative theory to the standard theory based on the criticism of the latter.
With the academic battle over the relative virtue of market versus governmental allocation of resources largely settled by the 1950s, economists devolved their eff orts to extending the so called neoclassical frameworks to explain realworld phenomena observed in the markets.
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Basically as stated above BE was developed as a reaction to the inadequacies of the neoclassical model which is rather an important building stone of main stream economics. But what exactly is the neo -classical model? What does it assume? Why should it be criticized? Wikipedia 11 defi nes it as a branch of economics that studies the allocation of scarce resources between competing uses and users, based on principles of market equilibrium and profi t maximization. According to the neoclassical model then, people and companies are always assessing the value of the things that they do and try to maximize the profi t they get from it. But some researchers have questioned if this is actually the case that people are only interested in furthering their own economic wealth.
Th e studies of Rabin contradict the assumption that people work only in their own interest, not caring about what he calls social goals. In his paper he presented a model that accounts for the so called element of integrity, that is, the readiness of people to sacrifi ce their own materialistic well-being to help someone who is kind or punish one who is not, although the model does suggest that behaviour implications are greatest when the material consequences are not too signifi cant.
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So perhaps we are not as egocentric as the neoclassical model would have us believe and there are other more complex reasons for our behaviour than the maximization of our own utilities. Rabin was not the only researcher to discover other motivations behind an individual's behaviour other than the maximisation of their resources.
Th e studies of Fehr and Schmidt confi rm that there is a fraction of people who are also motivated by fairness considerations and that the classical theory of the homo oeconomicus with purely egotistical motives is not observed in real life.
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Th us the above mentioned studies question the fundamental basis of the neoclassical model which logically led some to explain the other possible motivations of people and why they act the way that they do in a certain situation. Th is eventually led to the birth of a new fi eld of research, behavioural economics.
Behavioural economics off ers more realistic explanations of human decisions and macroeconomic processes than the neoclassical approach. It is rapidly invading other areas of life such as psychology and entering the economic realm. ematics was something that defi ned behavioural economics as economics, and therefore as diff erent from psychology.
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Th e core of current behavioural economics is Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory. Th ey state that in creating the theory they deliberately proceed as conservatively as possible. Kahneman and Tversky created a combination of neoclassical economics and cognitive psychology, and their approach has remained the approach of all researchers in the fi eld. 16 Th e prospect theory departs from the neoclassical model in that it argues that people weigh the potential losses and gains rather than the fi nal outcome. Th ere has been a fair amount of research in this particular area and the article will look into later.
Bounded rationality
As already outlined a key element of neoclassical economics is the idea of a rational agent acting rationally to maximise his own economic gains. But how is rationality defi ned?
Rationality is defi ned as acting so as to maximize subjective expected value, and the implicit assertion is that persons should act so as to maximize their selfinterest over the time horizon they can encompass. Not doing so is defi ned as irrational.
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But is someone acting altruistically irrational? It seems to be a sad state of aff airs that helping someone in trouble and expecting no gain from it is considered irrational.
Economic rationality can be characterized by self-interested goals or not. Behaving altruistically is not always equivalent to behaving irrationally. 18 So the concept of rationality itself is not stable as it is evolving with contemporary theories.
Th us, it will be proved that the words rational and rationality do not possess the same meaning.
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Reality is diff erent because many risk their safety to get instant gratifi cation. However, in the acceptation of von Mises the individual is rational because it acts in order to satisfy their needs. As economists began to observe situations where people seemed to be acting diff erently they began to ask themselves why. What are the reasons behind such behaviour? Is it irrational? Th is led to the concept of bounded rationality.
Bounded rationality is the idea proposed by Herbert Simion became one of the pylons on which behavioural economies is set. Th is idea advocates that rationality of people is a priori limited by given factors like access to information, their fi nite amount of time, and the cognitive limitations of their mind. 21 Economists began to make allowances and to understand that man was not perfect and there were internal and external infl uences which aff ected his behaviour.
March and Simon are the fi rst to have questioned the assumption of absolute rationality by introducing the concept of bounded rationality. Th ey indicate that the rationality of an agent is limited by three factors and consequently, they substitute the goal of maximizing the expected utility by that of satisfaction meaning that the individual does not take an optimal decision but rather a satisfactory decision. Th e three key factors of bounded rationality are: 22 1. the assumption that the information is incomplete 2. the assumption of what they refer to as individual motivations 3. the assumption that the actors´ capacities are limited So the agent is determined to seek satisfaction for his wants rather than using his resources to their maximum eff ect. Sometimes his satisfaction may be short sighted or short lived.
Main stream economics assumes that people are rational, patient, forward thinking, and profi cient at decision making, thereby making choices that maximize their utility by which they mean the benefi ts a person derives from a good or service. However, we know that individuals oft en have diffi culty making wise choices, especially when faced with decisions that involve uncertainty, trade-off s between current and future costs and benefi ts, or signifi cant complexity.
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BE examines the implications for decision-making of agents when actors suffer from biases documented in the psychological literature. BE scholars replace the assumption of rationality by bounded rationality in which the agents´ actions are aff ected by their initial endowments, their tastes for fairness, their inability to appreciate future costs, their lack of self-control, and the general use of fl awed heuristics.
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From the perspective of BE we can accept the idea of a rational individual if we reformulate it and accept that the homo oeconomicus of neoclassical taught, when seeking to maximize utility, does not seek to achieve the highest possible monetary compensation at the end of the day, but the highest satisfaction possible.
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4 Th e impact of behavioural economics on policy today Th e emerging fi eld of BE seeks to develop more precise theory on the behaviour of economic agents. Th e recent success of this new approach shows the gap between economic theory and reality can take time to fi ll. 26 As stated in previous chapters over time the neoclassical view of the world has become less attractive as it seems to fail to explain certain situations or events.
Economists have begun to appreciate that people are less predictable or do not act in the way the model suggests.
Standard economic models exclude emotions because they are too complex, unruly and ephemeral. But today, the behavioural economists add a psychology dimension to the traditional economic model to take account of emotions and human irrationality.
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Th e economic events will never be really understood unless confronted with the fact that their causes are largely mental in nature. Th is assumption stands in opposition to the neoclassical approach, which postulates that human beings are unrestrained in their optimal decisions, self-control, plans, intentions, ability to overcome problems, internal barriers and profi t calculations.
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At the core of behavioural economics is the conviction that increasing the realism of the psychology underlying economic analysis will improve the fi eld of economics on its own terms-generating theoretical insights, making better predictions of fi eld phenomena, and suggesting better policy. So it would appear that BE may be able to give us useful insights into the human mind which may help guide policy makers in making better decisions, or at least more economically effi cient decisions.
Th e fi nancial crisis has provided new impetus to behavioural economics, in the search for an explanation for events which would seem to constitute massive falsifying evidence to a body of theory which presumed markets to be effi cient and equilibrating. 30 So the mainstream view of the economy seemed at the very least to be suspect, and obviously politicians also need to convince the electorate that they are in control and that lessons have been learnt and that there is an alternative to avoid such a situation in the future, i.e. BE.
Among others, BE became an important source of inspiration for a number of advisors and bureaucrats in the new Obama administration that came into power in January 2009.
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Th e Obama administration is not the only one to call in behavioural economists to help in policy making decisions. Th e British Prime Minister David Cameron has also set up his own group of advisors which include behavioural economists.
Although BE may seem to many to be able to answer the failings of neoclassical assumptions it is not without fault.
Th ere has been a range of critiques of BE on the grounds that it can provide ex post explanations for behaviour, but falls short on prediction.
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Th e usefulness of a theory or model that can tell us why something has happened aft er it has happened is arguably limited. Yes it is nice to know why something happened but stopping it from happening again or predicting and taking preventative action is surely more important. One strength of BE is that its fi ndings are and can be proved in experiments where conditions are controlled and monitored, but this can also be seen as a weakness.
Many behavioural economic studies were conducted as experiments under lab conditions. Th is method is preferred by scientists because it allows extraneous variables to be controlled. However, extensive reliance on lab studies has led some critics to suggest that behavioural economics' key fi ndings may apply only 30 DOW, S.,C.,Formalism, rationality, and evidence: the case of behavioural economics. -or at least much more strongly -under the artifi cial conditions of the lab, and not in the fi eld.
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One other signifi cant fault is like the neoclassical model it fails to explain some occurrences.
We know, for example, that various political, psychological, and social factors lead to certain actors engaging in the behaviour of suicide bombing, which cannot be justifi ed by any form of the neoclassical model but which also cannot be explained or predicted by any existing model provided by BE, unless the concept of subjective utility is arbitrarily expanded.
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Th is is a problem for BE as it cannot answer some of the problems that the neoclassical model could not answer either and as a consequence perhaps it is reliant on a model which is already fl awed and thus will always be left wanting.
Behavioural economics, as the fi eld stands today, consists of standard neoclassical economics with several psychological factors graft ed on to account for some, though by no means all, of the failures of the neoclassical model. Th e result is an ad hoc collection of concepts and factors that are basically disconnected, standalone concepts. 35 Th ere are also other problems with BE. It may be caused by its relatively new prominence or the fact that it is based on a fl awed model but there are some new concepts which are contradictory or at the very least the relationship between the elements is unclear.
Th e key thesis of BE being the systematic biases that are built into people's choices which prevent utility maximization is subject to diff erent interpretations. One can hold that these systematic limitations are found in all people, are congenital or even wired in a universalistic interpretation, or that they are found only among some people or that one and the same person can sometimes optimize and at other times cannot. BE would benefi t if this important issue would be clarifi ed. 
Introduction of Behavioural Law and Economics
37
With the emergence of BE it was only a matter of time before law would be combined with it in some way as the two fi elds are inter related. It should be observed that comparative law scholars are in eff ect already capitalizing on research in behavioural economics by using this research's insights on how people actually behave -as opposed to mere hypothesized behaviour -as a basis for evaluating the eff ectiveness or effi ciency of supranational rules and doctrines. 38 It seems natural that learning about an agents economic behaviour might have some useful spin off s, especially in the regulation of the fi nancial industry as a result of the fi nancial crisis for example.
Emerging close on the heels of behavioural economics over the past thirty years has been the BLE movement, which explores the legal and policy implications of cognitive biases. 39 As has been mentioned before the Obama administration has been quick to see the advantages of BE and consequently of BLE.
Regulatory policies in the United States are already being informed by BLE. President Obama issued an Executive Order requiring federal agencies to consider regulatory options that preserve what is referred to as freedom of choice for the public, and is now forming a so called Behavioural Insights Team to employ BLE work more broadly and systematically across the government. 40 Th e promise of BLE is to regulate so as to improve economic welfare by more closely aligning each individual's actual choices with his true or unbiased preferences without reducing his liberty, at least as it is represented by the choices available to him.
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BLE rather seeks to identify systematic departures from rational decisionmaking by empirical research and make policy recommendations based on these insights.
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Th e argument is that people have a desire to do something but are stopped from doing so by some inbuilt biases which can be unveiled by BLE research. Even if an agent can understand that a certain course of action is not good for them they still continue with the action at their own detriment. Th us the idea of paternalistic regulation has begun to evolve. If the policy makers discover a certain weakness in their agents then it may be considered only fair and just to help those agents avoid making such mistakes.
Behavioural fi ndings showing the failure of individual choice oft en point toward policy prescriptions that limit choice or mandate outcomes. But most proponents of BLE do not push analysis to this point and focus instead on lighttouch regulatory tools that preserve wide scope for choice. 43 In a nutshell, psychological economist's goal is to use behavioural conceptual tools to overcome individual cognitive limitations and/or emotional and aff ective dispositions that sometimes lead to distorted and even self-destructive patterns of behaviour. 
Analysis of selected fi ndings
We are loss averse. Loss aversion refers to the tendency for people to prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains. Studies suggest that losses are as much as twice as psychologically powerful as gains. Tversky and Kahnemann. Th ey showed that people are generally risk averse when facing gains but risk seeking when facing losses. For instance, a penalty is a stronger incentive than a similarsized reward. 45 Th is could obviously have a big impact on BLE as it suggests that a policy where people are fi ned would be more eff ective than one where you are off ered a reward. For instance if the policy wanted to encourage people to hand in their tax forms in on time a penalty for those handing the form late would be more eff ective than a reward to those handing it in on time. Other studies have also found that other people's actions may impact on our own.
We are infl uenced by social forces. Individuals informed about the actions of others tend to conform to others behaviours. 46 Also giving people too many choices may be a bad thing as they have too much information and fall back into the default position of doing nothing. An example of such behaviour is the case of optional healthcare insurance providing that the competitiveness in the market with personal healthcare insurance is not anyhow limited and hence in accordance with the idea of free market. In that case a large amount of people may fail to get insured simply because of the complexity and amount of choice. Th is could generally apply to the whole idea of the 43 free market that assumes that the agents have at their disposal all the available information which for quite obvious reasons is only a theoretical assumption. It not only fails to copy the reality but quite frankly it could be argued that it may not even be the most desired situation for the agents themselves and their decision making process. Th e fact that it may not be in their interest to get as much information as possible in order to make the desired decision because that could lead to the opposite eff ect; that is, not actually acting at all due to too much information. Th is tends to shake the fi ndings on which economics is based.
Also called choice overload, as the number of choices expands people become overwhelmed and choose nothing, or select the default option. 47 Th ese fi ndings support public policies that are built on so called liberal choice architecture suggested by Th aler and Sunstein in 2008 which entails making organizational arrangements that help people make better choices, without requiring them to process information or learn to control their loss aversion or other emotions. 48 One of the impacts of BE and BLE reality is the argument that you can and should try to guide agents to the optimal decision helping them maximise their satisfaction as they are not capable of doing so themselves. Which again gives space and the impulse for government policies?
Soft paternalistic interventions are justifi ed in terms of the view that the person towards whom we act paternalistically is not competent due to ignorance, irrational propensities, defi ciencies in cognition and emotional dispositions. 49 It has been observed that small changes in wording or context can change agents´ actions. Th us small changes in laws and regulation which take into account these factors may be benefi cial for the agent.
Behavioural economists off er compelling evidence that boundedly rational agents' choices are infl uenced by small changes in context, default rules, legal and organizational rules and sensitive to framing eff ects and inertia. If this is so, we can conclude that boundedly rational individuals sometimes fail to make choices that are in their best interests. Th is gives room for attempts to overcome suboptimal behaviour by means of paternalistic measures. 50 supposition is that if the state interferes though for the good of the agent, is it then the state who should determine what is good for the agent or when to act in the agents´ interest? Th ese are just some of the problems which the paternalism debate brings up.
BLE oft en artifi cially and wrongly excludes more traditional regulatory tools, such as direct mandates, from its analysis of policy options. BLE sometimes fails to properly evaluate how its own regulatory tools actually function or ways in which actual individual behaviour suggests those tools should be modifi ed or abandoned.
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Another criticism of BLE is that it does not properly evaluate the eff ect of its own regulatory tools and as mentioned in the previous paragraphs what is considered soft paternalism might in eff ect turn out to be something far stronger.
Behavioural insights themselves powerfully suggest that people stay with the status quo for all the reasons so central to BLE in the fi rst place: people are inertial, passive, or under the impression that the default must represent the right choice, whether it does or not. As a result, these defaults function in practice, for many individuals, as eff ective mandates.
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Also if you accept that the state knows better than the agent is it not also suggesting that no one is allowed to make mistakes, must we always make the right decision? What is so wrong about making mistakes? Do we not learn from our failures?
Wright and others 53 argue that so long as libertarian paternalism ignores the economic welfare and liberty value of allowing individuals the freedoms to err, it will fail to achieve its goals of increasing welfare without reducing liberty and will pose a signifi cant risk of reducing both.
Conclusion
It can be claimed of many new theories that they did not live up to expectations but perhaps sometimes expectations are too high and too demanding. BE does not have all the answers to the neoclassical failures but given time it may provide useful insights into diff erent areas of economic and legal life. Aft er all BE is a relatively new fi eld and it may take a while to establish itself and to iron out the wrinkles left by the neoclassical model. Behavioural economics is not a miracle solution that has the ability to replace Keynesian or liberalism, but its use can improve the theories and models of both schools of thought. 54 BE has aimed at providing a more scientifi c basis for its theories which it tries to conduct in laboratory situations to give its theories a solid base which in itself is an achievement.
Given that many other social science fi ndings have not been replicated either because no one has tried them or they did not pan out, behavioural economists deserve high marks in this regard. 55 It can clearly be seen that BE and BLE are considered to be the new and in fi elds of research attracting the majority of researchers attention. It is perhaps no wonder when you consider the inputs of Kahneman and Tversky who found that agents were loss adverse and risk seeking and all the associated implications for government policy this may have.
Predictably Irrational and Nudge thus elucidate the systematic and pervasive nature of irrationality and can inform policy in every legal fi eld, ranging from consumer protection and environmental protection, through employment and health policies, to tax and fi nancial regulation. 56 Th e implications of BE and BLE are wide and varied as with the case of soft paternalism it may sometimes be for the good and sometimes it may lead to further problems. But one thing is sure and that is it is currently infl uencing government policy around the world.
More recently, it suggests that, in a real world of boundedly rational agents, economics could help to improve the quality of their choices without any harm to autonomy and freedom of choice. 57 By understanding the ways in which individuals are susceptible to biases and fl awed decision-making, law and policy can help improve individual and group behaviour. 58 Th e question though is how much will this soft paternalism penetrate into our lives and will we be able to make mistakes in the future? Only time will tell.
